Standards
Security & trust
A DPP is evidence. It must be tamper-evident, signed by an identifiable party, and verifiable offline.
Threat model
- Counterfeits cloning your QR to serve a fake DPP.
- Man-in-the-middle rewriting DPP responses in transit.
- Internal tampering with stored data after publication.
- Key compromise allowing forged attestations.
- Denial of resolution — your resolver goes offline.
Controls
- TLS 1.3 minimum on all endpoints. HSTS preload.
- Every DPP payload signed (JWS or JSON-LD data-integrity proofs).
- Signatures verifiable against a DID or an X.509 chain — prefer DIDs for cross-organisation scenarios.
- Append-only event log for writes; Merkle-anchored hash published daily.
- Key rotation policy with revocation lists (status list 2021 or similar).
- Redundant resolver hosting with a documented failover to a Foundation-or-industry backup in case of provider failure.
Trust lists
For cross-border acceptance, Member States are expected to maintain trust lists of authorised DPP issuers and market-surveillance callers — analogous to eIDAS trust lists. Align your issuer identity (DID or X.509) with the emerging EU trust list formats.